

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" Cast on the wildest of the Cyclad isles,
 " Where never human foot had mark'd the shore,
 " These ruffians left me—yet believe me, Arcas,
 " Such is the rooted love we bear Mankind,
 " All ruffians as they were, I never heard
 " A sound so dismal as their parting oars."

THOMSON; *Agam.* Act III.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ROBERT JEFFERY.—It has been stated in the news-papers of the 9th instant, that MR. JACKSON (our Envoy and Plenipotentiary in the United States of America) has transmitted a deposition, made by the poor fellow, ROBERT JEFFERY, so late as the 18th of June last, giving an account of the transaction "which has attracted so much public notice."—Stop here, reader, and mark, for a moment, the phraseology of this ministerial writer. "Attracted so much public notice." How did it attract notice? In what way did the most abominable act come to the knowledge of the public? It did not suit this writer to say: "the transaction, which, owing to the humanity and integrity of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, has been made known to the public and the world." Till he took up this affair, not a word did any one say about the matter. LAKE was tried by a court-martial, at Portsmouth, on the 5th and 6th of February last; and, on the 23rd of that month Sir Francis moved in the Honourable House for a copy of the minutes of that court-martial. But, first of all, he mentioned the matter in the Honourable House; and asked the ministers, whether they meant to take any steps relative to it. He told them, that, if they did not, he should. He accordingly made his motion in a few days afterwards. The effect of that motion was the production of the proof of the horrid deed of putting the poor fellow on shore upon a barren uninhabited rock, and there deliberately leaving him. The publication of the papers in the Register of the 17th of March, and in other public prints, excited a general feeling upon the subject. Still, however, nothing was DONE, till Sir Francis again took up the matter, and, upon his motion, made just two days before the Honourable House voted the sending of him to the Tower, an address was presented to the

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king requesting him to cause inquiries to be made to ascertain the fate of Jeffery. —The ministerial writer tells the public, that "Mr. Jackson's inquiries were, of course, made in consequence of official directions from home." Yes; to be sure they were; but, it was SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; it was SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who caused those directions to be given, and that, too, by a motion made about 48 hours before the Honourable House ordered him to be imprisoned in the Tower! —This writer is happy, he tells us, that "the result of these inquiries has proved so completely satisfactory as to the existence of Jeffery;" but, he does not tell us, what is the precise cause of his satisfaction; and, whether his satisfaction arises from the safety of Jeffery, or the safety of Lake. His expressions are quite equivocal; but, if the context be examined, I think it will appear, that he cared very little about the poor seaman.—He tells us, that Jeffery "was nine days upon the island, and supported himself upon limpets, and rain water from crevices in the rocks!" So! This is treatment for one of our "Jolly tars," is it? Verily, this is a thing that ought never to be forgotten. What feelings must not this treatment of Jeffery have excited amongst the people of America; and, especially amongst the sailors of New-England! I wonder what sort of commentary the author of the IMPOSTOR-PAMPHLET will make upon this transaction?—I know, or, at least, I have heard, that there are not wanting persons; wretches, cold-blooded wretches! let me, rather, call them, who scruple not to say, that Sir Francis's conduct, as to this matter, was mischievous; for, that the exposure of Lake's "irregularity," as SIR ALEX. COCHRANE calls it (See Register of 24th March, 1810. Vol. XVII. p. 464), would be likely to excite discontents in the navy. Never was any thing more detestable than this reasoning, according to which no ill-

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treatment of a seaman by his superiors could ever be made a subject of complaint, without the risk of doing harm to the sea-service. How much more forcible is the reasoning on the other side? How much more likely are such exposures (especially if proper steps be taken by the government in consequence of them) to prevent discontents from swelling into open mutiny, by shewing the seamen, that, however distant from home, when cruelly treated, they will, when their treatment be made known, not fail to meet with protection in England. What could possibly be better calculated to inspire the seamen in general with confidence in the justice of their country, than this vote for an address to the king in behalf of a common sailor? And, I am not easily to be persuaded, that the satisfaction and confidence of the seamen will be the less on account of the circumstance of the merit of the proceeding belonging exclusively to Sir Francis Burdett.—The poor fellow was set on shore in December, 1807; the act was known to Sir Alex. Cochrane soon afterwards; the Admiralty knew of it early in the summer of 1809; a court of inquiry was held upon the subject in December 1809; the court martial was held in about two months afterwards; Lake had, *after the deed*, and after Sir Alex. Cochrane *knew of it*, been promoted from a *Commander* to a *Post Captain*. All this time had elapsed, and nothing at all did the public know of the matter; till, on the 23rd of February last, Sir Francis Burdett took it in hand. To him, therefore, and to him alone, the thanks of Jeffery, and the thanks of all those who wished to see justice done in this case, are due. It may be said, that any other member could have done the thing as well as he. But, why *did* no other member do it? The *power*, the *capacity*, being possessed by *any other* member, is only another circumstance in proof of the superiority of Sir Francis Burdett's public virtue. When the thing was once before the House (and had *already been placed before the public*), there were enough to join him in reprobating the cruelty of Lake; but, what great merit was there in that? It would have been strange indeed if no one had joined him then. But, who was there that joined him before? Was there a single voice raised to second him when he first made inquiries into the matter?—This is a memorable transaction altogether, and must not soon be let drop. It is one of

the things to be kept *everlastingly alive*. But, it is, I should suppose, impossible that some further proceeding should not be adopted with respect to it. At any rate, as often as it is revived, either in conversation or in thought, let those who converse and think about it, always remember to whom we are indebted for all that has been done in this case, towards the obtaining of justice.—The *mother* of Jeffery, who is a widow, is alive. What joy must it be to her to find that her son is yet in existence! She, too, has to thank Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, had it not been for whom she would, in all likelihood, never have heard of that son again.—After all, however, let me not be understood as stating it for *fact*, that Mr. JACKSON has sent home proof of Jeffery's being alive. I must see Mr. Jackson's report, and examine it well, before I shall be convinced of the truth of what is now reported. The shortest way, and, in every respect, the best way, would be, to *bring Jeffery home to England*. There can be no reason for not doing it. The means are always at hand; and, there can be only one objection, which, indeed, may naturally occur: namely, that the poor fellow may be resolved never again to set his foot in England, or upon any land, or in any place or situation, where he may be exposed to the possibility of being again pressed on board an English ship of war; for, though, it is to be hoped, that his fears of a repetition of such treatment would be totally groundless, seeing that Lake is no longer in the naval service; yet, no one could blame him for entertaining such fears, and, of course, for resolving never to quit the country where he now is, and where, besides being amongst those who rescued him from the most horrid of deaths, he is in perfect security. Much, therefore, as one would wish, on some accounts, to see the man return to England; it would require, with me, some time for consideration, before, if my advice were asked, I should advise him to return. Where he is now, it is impossible for him to fall under a power sufficient to condemn him, without trial, to a desert rock. Where he is now, he is safe from the operation of any such power. Where he is now (in the *State of Massachusetts* it is said) he cannot be exposed to death for having taken a drink of spruce beer that did not belong exclusively to him. Where he is now, in short, if he has *not* both *liberty* and *property*, the fault is his, and not that of any body else.

FAREWELL OF THE ARGUS.—In another part of this sheet, I have inserted the FAREWELL of the famous public print, called the ARGUS. The editor, who is said to have been Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR, has not failed to demonstrate, in this his last Number, that the work does not cease for want of *talents* to keep it on.—The coyness of our public prints, with respect to this article, is well worthy of notice. They, in general, inserted little fragments of it for the purpose of speaking against it. Most of them *mentioned* it; but I have seen but two London papers, which have given it at full length, and those are THE TIMES and THE STATESMAN, the last of which, really, talks like a statesman upon the subject. It advises all those, who wish to see the country saved, to *read* this article, and *seriously reflect on its contents*; and observes, very justly, that the smile of *contempt*, which some of our prints affect to cast upon this production, will not save us.—It is, indeed, a most important paper; and, think what we will about it, the effect it will have produced on the continent must be very great.—It is quite useless for us to call the person who has written it “an *unnatural wretch*.” The Edinburgh Reviewers did the same, in reviewing a work of Mr. O'Connor's on the English paper-money. But this, whatever might be the justice or the injustice of it, had nothing to do with the writer's *facts* or his *reasonings*. There may, perhaps, be two opinions upon the subject of Mr. O'Connor's conduct, some persons thinking, that he ought still to love the government, by which he was banished from, and rendered an out-cast of, his native country; while others think, that it is most scandalous meanness in us, who support and approve of that government, to *complain of the loss of his friendship for it*, and especially to make this complaint in the very same breath, wherein we *speak of his talents with contempt*. But, in whatever way this question may be decided; whatever we may think of Mr. O'CONNOR's motives; whether we think his conduct unnatural in the extreme, or perfectly natural; still his *facts* and his *arguments* remain the same; and, we should be very careful not to disbelieve that which is *true*, merely because it comes from the pen of a man, whom we think it right to speak of as the blackest of villains, and, at the same time think it quite becoming in us to complain, that he betrays evident marks of his not loving us, in return for those kind sen-

timents.—In short, it is the very height of stupidity; of stupid, senseless, animal pride and conceit, and that alone, which can induce us to turn a deaf ear to the writer, merely because we hate the man, who, by the bye, is totally unaffected by our hatred.—Besides, we should, I think, be a little cautious how we speak of Mr. O'Connor, while we are *praising* and *dining* GENERAL SARRAZIN! There is, indeed, some difference in their cases. Mr. O'Connor was *banished*: General Sarrazin came away of his own accord; took French leave; or, as Vandamme calls it, *deserted*. Mr. O'Connor was *forced* from his *native country*. He was *compelled* to *adopt* another country; or, have no spot to call his country, and be like a Jew, a wanderer upon the face of the earth. In America there are hundreds of English merchants, all *staunch Pittites*, who have not only taken an oath of fidelity to the United States, but also AN OATH ABJURING ALL ALLEGIANCE TO THE KING OF ENGLAND. There are hundreds of these, many of whom have returned to England, and even now cut a most conspicuous figure amongst the *Turtle Patriots*. Many of these, under their American Citizenship, have supplied the enemies of England with war-like stores. Let the Edinburgh Reviewers, then, fall upon these fellows, and dispatch them, before they fall upon a gentleman who was *banished* from his country; who was *compelled* to *adopt* another country, or to have no spot to claim as his country, and to become a wanderer and a vagabond upon the face of the earth. Oh! “Wicked, malignant wretch!” Not choose to become a wanderer and a vagabond upon the face of the earth! But, to choose, rather, to write an exposure of the English system of finance, and to puzzle the feelosofers of Edinbro'! Time, which tries all things, has tried both the *work* and the *criticism*, here alluded to; and, in a future Number, I shall shew, that it would have been good for this nation, had it listened to what Mr. O'Connor then wrote, instead of greedily swallowing what was said by those, who garbled the work and foully abused its author.—Let us avoid a repetition of what took place then. Let us, at any rate, *read* what Mr. O'Connor has written. Let us look upon him as a mortal enemy, of our government at least; but, let us calmly inquire, whether he *speak truth*, and whether he *reason*

correctly. The picture that he exhibits is, perhaps, exaggerated; the eagerness of his wishes may have been too powerful for his reason; but is there any man, who really feels anxious; who feels any portion of *anxiety*, for the permanent security of England against the arms of France; is there any such man, who can refrain from being deeply impressed with apprehensions, that the part of the article, which relates to maritime force and operations, has but too much truth in it? We do not see, because we will not see, the danger to be apprehended from the inevitably increasing marine of Napoleon. It must, if he wishes it, increase to a size enormous, and that, too, in a comparatively short space of time. There is now nothing for Napoleon to do upon the continent except in Spain and Portugal; and, when that last continental labour is finished, will there be *no apprehensions for Ireland*, which as we are daily told, is, even now, *agitated with a French faction*?—What is, in this essay, said about the South American colonies is well worthy of attention. It is what every one of us should read every hour in the day; because there is yet time to avoid or avert what is here predicted; and this is the use, to which sensible people put the predictions of their enemies. I do not say, that, if we had listened to Mr. O'Connor in the year 1804, upon the subject of paper-money, we could have done any thing to prevent the accomplishment of his predictions; but, we should have sooner perceived the real state of our affairs, and sooner got rid of the shackles of delusion.

CORN CROPS.—In my Register of the 4th instant, page 142, I recommended the *permitting of all the soldiers in the kingdom to work during the harvest*, observing, that if it should be *catching weather*, this would make a material difference in the price of bread.—The news-papers now tell us, “that an order has been issued from the war-office, for not more than *one-fourth of each battalion of the regular infantry and militia stationed in the Kent district to be employed in getting in the harvest*, and that it is left entirely in the power of the Commanding Officer whether any or what part of that number shall be so employed.”—This is *something*; and especially if the same be done in all the other districts. I can see no reason why the whole should not have such permission; and, I shall not be found fault with, in this instance, by the ministerial writers,

who tell the public; who are labouring and sweating like negroes to hammer it into the heads of their readers, that we are in such a state of safety, in England, “*that we do not want a single regular soldier in the island.*” This is, indeed, somewhat different from the opinions of Mr. Attorney General, and Judge Grose; but, this is what they say; that *we do not want a single regular soldier in England, of any sort whatever*, and that every regular soldier ought to be sent out of it, to learn, in Spain, Portugal, Walcheren, and elsewhere, to beat the French. Of this we may say more, perhaps, hereafter; but, if it be true, that we do not want a single regular soldier in England, notwithstanding the opinions of the above-mentioned grave personages; if this be true, surely all the regular soldiers between this and the time that they are sent off to learn to beat the French in Spain, Walcheren, and Portugal, might be safely employed in works of agriculture?—At any rate, let it be remembered, that the measure, as far as it has been adopted, originated in a recommendation of mine; and, what is of more importance, in an act of the government itself we have here a recognition of the principle, *that agriculture suffers from the raising and maintaining of armies*; that is to say, in the changing of labourers into unproductive people; a principle which has never been sufficiently inculcated in this country, where, however, men do really, at last, seem disposed to listen.—The loaf, I see, continues to rise; and, I shall be very much surprized if it stops short of 2 shillings. I, at one time, thought it would go higher; and, appearances then warranted my opinion. The very great change, however, which has taken place in the appearance of the Barley and Oats more than in the Wheat, and the favourable appearance of the potatoes, induce me to think, that bread will be less dear than I expected at first; but still I think it will be very dear.—From a letter, which I insert in another part of this sheet, it would seem that the harvest in Ireland *promises to be abundant*. The price of the quartern loaf, however, appears to have been *sixteen pence*, at Dublin, on the 3rd instant. Irish money, of course; but, this is very dear for Ireland, and quite inconsistent with the fact, as stated by my correspondent, of an approaching greatly abundant crop.—As to imports, my opinion is, that, if we have a *decided scarcity*, we shall get very little

corn from abroad. The reason of which is plain. Napoleon will not, perhaps, be foolish enough to entertain the hope of starving us; but, it is not unnatural to suppose, that he will endeavour to add to our distress; or, rather, that he will do nothing, and suffer nothing to be done (if he can prevent it) to alleviate that distress. Indeed, they who suppose that he will not act thus must be downright fools. There may be persons, who believe, that our ministerial papers (see the Morning Post of the 9th instant) calling Napoleon a "*base born villain*," will tend to prevent him from acceding to our wishes in letting us have corn. In the paper, here referred to, the ministerial editor says: "*Englishmen will mourn, that human nature can so debase itself*" (as in the case of the people of France) "*while they will exult in the happy lot of their own country, which, favoured by Heaven, is exempted from the controul of the base-born villain, who, through a strange combination of unfortunate circumstances, at present sways the destinies of the continent.*"—Very well. But, why do we go crouching to him for corn, then? Why do we go with our *overtures* to "*the base-born villain*?" If we be so much better off than his people; if our lot be so much more happy; if we ought to exult in the comparison; if Heaven has favoured us in putting us beyond the reach of his controul, why do we seek any thing from him? Why do we court a commercial intercourse with him? To be sure, any thing so inconsistent; so foolish; so contemptible, as this abuse of Napoleon, at a time when we are making overtures, which, say what we will, fall little short of *appeals to his humanity*, has been seldom met with even in these ministerial prints. Yet, this is surpassed by their impudence in calling upon us to *exult in our happy lot compared to that of the people of France*, at the very moment when they are telling us, that they are in hopes that we shall get some food from the abundance of that people to make up for the deficiency, with which we are threatened, and which we actually experience. Under such circumstances, we should hold our tongues about the miseries of France. For mere decency's sake we should do this. For the sake of avoiding the contempt of the world, we should do this. For the sake of not being despised as impudent, empty, bragging fools, we should do this.—Napoleon, however, will not be at all in-

fluenced by any thing that these writers say. Their revilings, if they were to reach his ears, would be full as agreeable to him as would be their adulation, and, perhaps, more so; certainly more so, if he could form an idea of what are, in general, the objects of that adulation.—He, however, we may be assured, will not, in his measures, be at all influenced by any thing that they say. If he finds, that the keeping of his corn from us, will tend to add to our distress, he will keep his corn from us; and with this we must lay our account. From America we can get but very little corn. It cannot supply us with much. Therefore, if we are wise, we shall make up our minds to live through the year upon the produce of our own soil, and the soil of our colonies.—We should, however, take every precaution in the way of *economizing*; and, I still think, that a great deal may be done by *reducing the number of the cavalry horses*, especially if it be true, as the Morning Post says, that we have no need of a regular soldier in England or Scotland. Suppose, however, that there are only twenty thousand, that might be, for a time, at least, dispensed with. The food of *twenty thousand horses* is immense. Enough, probably, to support two hundred thousand poor, if you take waste into consideration.—This is a matter, which I think well worth the serious attention of the government, who, having, in part, at least, followed my advice in one case, may have less scruple to do it in another case; if there be a *plenty* of corn, it is another thing; but, if there be a scarcity, it behoves the government to neglect nothing within its power to prevent the people from suffering. Mr. CURWEN, perhaps, will say that there is no danger, for, that, though bread should be a crown a loaf, that will not make *milk* scarce, and that *milk* is the staff of life; but, as in the case of the tanner's recommendation to fortify the town with leather, the advice would only excite a laugh at so admirable a demonstration of stupid selfishness.

TAXING WORK.—The following paragraphs are copied from the news-papers of the 14th instant.—They speak of what is *fact* I dare say; and such facts are of great importance to the public; and, especially when we consider what is *the cause* of the tax, to insure the collection of which such laws have been made.

"A respectable paper maker, in Devonshire, and hitherto a man of unblemished character, has suddenly absconded, having been detected in forging the Excise-man's stamp on the wrappers of his paper. The iron instrument with which he did it, was found in his wife's pocket, and she has in consequence been committed to Exeter gaol.—An opulent tanner, at Kingsbridge, has absconded for a like offence, having been detected in forging the stamp for marking hides. The poor fellow who inadvertently made the implements for him, and who is armourer in the Hants Militia, is to be tried for his life, at the Assizes, which commence at Exeter this day."—Here is food for reflection. Here is a man, an Englishman, to be arraigned for his life; the cause of that is, that he has made a stamp to mark leather with; the cause of that was, that he was hired so to do by a tanner who wished to put a mark upon his own leather; the cause of that was, that the tanner, by such means, would avoid paying a tax upon the leather so marked. Then there only remains to ask *what was the cause of the tax?* Or, in other words; what becomes of the money, *how is the money expended*, that is raised upon the people in taxes? *To what uses is applied that money*, to insure the collecting of which those laws have been made which put this man upon a trial for his life?—Here is food for reflection. I should like to see an essay upon this subject from the pen of Mr. WILBERFORCE, or any other person of his description.—The IMPOSTOR PAMPHLET has a good deal upon the subject of taxing work, but it has nothing that exactly meets this point. In another edition of it, which will, possibly, be preparing, by the time that this Register reaches Philadelphia, the author may, perhaps, be disposed to say a little something in reference to facts like those mentioned in these paragraphs; and, in the mean while, I will go on collecting more of them, and putting them upon record.

FLOGGING SOLDIERS.—The following articles are copied from the Morning Chronicle of the 13th and 14th instant. They are very well worthy of being placed in a situation where they can be referred to some months, or perhaps, some years, hence. Those, who take the trouble of preparing such articles for the press, would do well to be a little more circum-

stantial as to *names and dates*, without which such articles are likely to fail of answering the purpose, for which they are intended.—"CORPORAL CURTIS, lately sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes, but who was remanded on his petition to be sent to a condemned regiment, has been permitted, after receiving 200 lashes, to volunteer into a regiment on foreign service.—GREENWOOD, and the other private of the Oxford Militia, who were tried by a Brigade Court Martial, at Shoreham, have been sentenced to receive 500 lashes each, but have escaped punishment, by volunteering into a regiment on foreign service.—WILLIAM CLIFFORD, a private in the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, was lately sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes for repeatedly striking and kicking his superior officer. On Thursday he underwent part of the sentence by receiving 750 lashes, at Canterbury, in presence of the whole garrison.—A private of the 4th Foot, 2d battalion, has been sentenced by a Court Martial to receive 800 lashes, for drawing his bayonet on his serjeant whilst on board a transport at Spithead. Another man of the same regiment has been sentenced to receive 600 lashes, for striking his serjeant.—A garrison Court-Martial has been held on board the Metcalf transport, at Spithead, on some men of the fourth regiment of foot, for disrespectful behaviour to their Officers. Two thousand six hundred lashes were to be inflicted among them yesterday."—Among them! This is an odd way of putting such a fact upon record. *How many* men were there? "*Some men*" leaves the matter very doubtful. And, what corps did they belong to? Who was the Commander of them? If a fact be worth stating at all, it is worth stating fully and accompanied with the *names of the parties* and of the corps.—By stating such facts in a very clear and circumstantial manner great public good may, in time, be produced. At any rate, they are matter of history; they belong to the history of our country and of our times; it is due to the nation and fair towards all the parties concerned to record them; but, again I must express my hope, that, in future, they will be recorded rather *more fully and circumstantially*, by those, who think it worth their while to prepare the statement of them for the press. They appear, at first sight, to be mere gossiping paragraphs; but, certain I am, that the publication of them,

in a circumstantial way, would be of great public benefit.

PAPER-MONEY.—In my last, at page 173, I made a remark or two respecting certain articles, that had appeared in the Morning Post news-paper, the object of which articles appeared to be, to feel the pulse of the public with regard to a proposition, started in the same print, a little while before, for *abolishing* what it called “those destructive assignats,” the Country Bank notes.—At the same time, that I noticed these articles, in the brief way here described, I intimated my intention of noticing them more fully in this present Number, and of endeavouring to make the question between the *country money* and the *Threadneedle Street money* as clear as all the other parts of the subject now appear to be to almost every reader.—In fulfilment of this intention, I shall first state the substance, or, at least, the chief points in the several articles alluded to. They are five in number, and their dates are, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th of this present month. To insert them at full length would require more room than I have now to spare; but, I think, I shall preserve them in my next; for, insignificant as they are *in themselves*, they are of great importance as being *the first symptoms of the abandonment of the paper-system by the adherents of Pitt*, besides being, perhaps, actually intended, by the ministers themselves, to sound the public as to a scheme for *giving to the Bank of England an exclusive power of making paper-money*.—The truth is, as the reader will see at every step, the partizans of the paper-system do not know what to be at. They are at their wits’ end. To give up the *whole* system is, however, what they cannot think of doing. They therefore give up one branch of it; and they hope, thereby, to save the remainder.—We will first take a view of their description of the *EVIL*, and then we will hear what they have for a *REMEDY*, or, rather, for remedies, the projects in this way being not a little numerous.—They say, that the paper-money of this country has long been working the ruin of the man of real property;—that, at last, it has swollen to an enormous evil;—that the land-holder is robbed by the paper-money maker;—that the country bankers do not possess a valuable consideration as security for their notes;—that, if the country banker break, he can seldom, or never, pay ten shillings

in the pound;—that every bank-note, issued by a country-banker, is issued to the prejudice of the public, and to that of the man of fixed income in particular.—This is pretty well to begin with. A “READER,” this gentleman signs himself. The next assailant of country-banks takes the signature of *CLERICUS*, and he lays about him with a degree of zeal that proves him to belong to the true Church militant. He calls the country banks “horrid nuisances;” says they have been, of late, most “*indecently*” multiplied; gives the scene of action the vulgar name of “shop;” says, that the bankers collect up all the hard-money to sell; complains that even the poor labourers are obliged to go unpaid, week after week, because they can neither give nor get change for “the vile, dirty rags, that are offered to them in payment, called bank-notes;” inveighs most bitterly against the farmers, who, by the means of loans of this “vile paper, are enabled to keep back their corn;” avers that the “honest shop-keeper, artisan and mechanic are robbed of the fruits of their labour by these covetous and crafty bankers.”—Another Letter is signed, “A CONSTANT READER;” and, the author of it says, that he has been lately in the West of England, where the distress, owing to the stoppage of the banks at Salisbury and elsewhere, is hardly to be described.—Another writer states himself to be a person, who has an annual income of several hundreds of pounds, which, for nine or ten years past has been paid him wholly in country bank-notes; and he says, that, in all that time, he has not received a guinea or a bank of England note.—Now, before we proceed to speak of the *remedies*, proposed by these writers (who, perhaps, are all *one and the same person*), let me beg the reader to look a little better at this language, and to recollect *how often I have been abused* in this same Morning Post for having spoken contemptuously of the paper-money system. But, stop a little, the time is not far distant, when we shall hear language a great deal worse than this. The tide is just beginning to turn; but it is only beginning. It will roll backward as fast as ever it rolled forward.—As to *REMEDIES*, the first of these projectors says, that he is firmly convinced, that *Government alone, or the bank of England under the controul of the government*, should have the power of issuing bank-notes.—The next goes more into detail. He proposes, that

no man should have a license to be a paper-money maker without first making oath that he has property sufficient to answer all the notes that he intends to issue; or that he should find good bondmen to bind themselves to pay all his banking debts, in case he should be unable to pay them himself; or that he should satisfy the Commissioners of Taxes in his district, and should from them obtain a certificate, that he has property sufficient for all the purposes of his intended business; or, that he should obtain a public notification from the Governor and Company of the Bank of England that they would, at all times, be ready to exchange his notes.—These are the suggestions of CLERICUS, of which the next writer approves, particularly of the last; and he adds, as a scheme of his own, the sending of a quantity of *half-pence* weekly into the country, as a means of relieving the present distress of the poor! —Good father!—But, let us hear them out.—The next projector would have one government bank, established in every county, conducted by the Treasury, or by the Directors of the Bank of England, to be called the “County Government Bank,” or the “Bank of England County Bank.” He would have all taxes, collected, paid into these banks; and, he is quite confident, that, while this is the most popular measure that government could adopt, it is “*plain, clear, and easy of experiment.*” —Such are the REMEDIES proposed by these projectors; and, foolish as they are; absurd and ridiculous as they are, the public may be assured, that they are entertained, and seriously entertained by many persons not destitute of influence.—It has, for some time past, been the fashion amongst the great fund-holders and money-dealers to cry aloud against the *country bank paper*. Their reasons for this were obvious enough; and, it really does appear to me, that persons of this description, including all those more immediately connected with the Bank of England, are pleased at what has now happened to the country banks; nay, I am decidedly of opinion, that if it fell in their way, they would, as the saying is, lend a hand to help the lame dog over the stile. Their purposes may, indeed, be answered by the abolishing of country banks, in just the same way that the interests of three or four great porter-brewers would be furthered by a law to put down all other breweries; but, what good the

public would derive from the establishment of such a monopoly it is not, I think, easy to point out.—The evils produced by the country money are, First, an *enhancing of the nominal price* of every thing, and thus operating to the great injury of people of fixed incomes in particular.—But, how would the proposed change alter this? How would it remedy this evil? This evil is produced by the *quantity* and not by the *kind* of the circulating paper; and, what is proposed, is, to change the kind merely without at all reducing the quantity.—SECONDLY, the difficulty of *getting change* would be just as great when the country money had given place to the Threadneedle Street money as it is now, unless the quantity of the notes were reduced.—THIRDLY, supposing it to be an evil to enable farmers to hold their corn back from sale, why could they not do it by the means of one kind of paper as well as another?—FOURTHLY, it may be said, that there would be less danger from *bankruptcy*. From *partial bankruptcy* there certainly would; but, I think, there can be very little doubt, that, if any of these schemes were adopted, a *general bankruptcy* would be greatly hastened on. As matters now stand, there is for part of the country money, at any rate, *land security*; though, from Mr. Waddington's letter, inserted in my last Number, it would seem, that capital, or *property*, is the last thing that a money maker thinks of. Still, however, there is *land security* for a part of the country money. But, if it were all Threadneedle street money, or, as these projectors seem to wish, *government money*, which would indeed, be the same thing, what *security* would there then be? And, who would then prescribe limits to the printing of paper-money? Will these wiseacres ask us what *better security* we want than that of the government, supported as it is? If they do, we have only to remind them, that the *Assignats of France* had government security, and, to make them still more solid, each bit of paper bore upon the face of it, that the holder had a *mortgage* for the amount upon the *National Lands*. The assignats, or, mortgage bonds, did, nevertheless, become waste paper, and the holders, if in the habit of smoking, had the advantage of possessing nice convenient snips for lighting their pipes. Just the same took place in the case of the Congress-Money in America. And the same will always take place, when the government becomes the issuer of a currency



which has not an intrinsic value. This seems strange to such people as those whom I have quoted above. They look upon the government as being the safest debtor, because it has *so much power*. But, do we reason thus in common life? Do we wish for *powerful* debtors? Do we find it most easy to get our money from such debtors? Do men like to have *peers* for their debtors? What reason, then, should induce them to prefer a debtor, who, if there be no law to exempt him from the payment of his debts, *can make such law*, at any moment that he pleases? What should induce them to prefer a debtor like this to a debtor, who is amenable to the existing and known law? In France and America the government was the debtor, and they paid with a sponge; and, we have, in Holland, an example not many weeks old, of what sort of a debtor a *government* may become when it chooses. Not that I take upon me to *blame* what has been done in Holland, any more than I do the *deduction made from the interest on English stock, under the name of property tax*; or of the law, passed to *prevent the creditors of the Bank of England from recovering money due to them from that bank, upon promissory notes*. I do not take upon me to blame any of these measures; but, really, it is being a little too foolish for “A READER,” and even for “a constant READER,” of the Morning Post, to suppose, that a paper-currency, not exchangeable, at pleasure, into coin, would be *less liable* to an excessive issue, if it proceeded directly from under the authority of the government; to believe that such excess would find a *check* in the circumstance of the issue being in the hands of *uncontrollable power*. This is, one would have thought, a little too absurd and stupid even for a “Clerical READER” of the Morning Post. —Now, all that has been said here as to the consequences of the government taking into its *own hands* the issuing of paper-money to supply the place of that now issued from the country banks, applies, with nearly equal force, to the putting of a like power in the hands of the Threadneedle Street Company, which, in such case, would, in appearance as well as in fact, become identified with the government. —In short, all these schemes and projects are the effect, not of reflection, but of a conviction of danger. They bear no distinctive marks of any thing but haste; haste, not of courage or of zeal, but of trepidation and ignorance; of folly

in a fright. As in most other desperate cases, the patient, having been given up by men of science, who have left her to die quietly, has become a subject whereon for ignorant and conceited quacks to make experiments. —It is, however, a *growing persuasion*, that the *country bank-notes* are the cause of the pecuniary evils we experience, as a proof of which, and as a document hereafter to be referred to, I shall here insert a set of Resolutions, which, it appears, have been passed in the Town of CARNARVON, against receiving Country bank-notes:—“At a Meeting of the “Tradesmen and others of the Town of “Carnarvon, convened at the Guild-Hall, “on Friday the third day of August, 1810, “to take into consideration the propriety “of rejecting or accepting local Notes in “consequence of the numerous Failures “that have taken place among the Coun- “try Banks.—It was resolved unani- “mously,—That it is the opinion of this “Meeting, that *no Local Notes whatever* “ought to be received; and we pledge our- “selves not to accept any Notes in payment “except those of the Bank of England, from “and after the 20th day of August instant. “—That this Resolution be published “twice in the North Wales Gazette, and “by Hand Bills, to be circulated in the “Town of Carnarvon, and be signed by “the Gentlemen attending the Meeting. “—That the Thanks of the Meeting be “presented to the Chairman, for his con- “duct in the Chair.”—This pledge is signed by *fifty persons*, and, as the whole is in a *printed hand-bill*, we may easily suppose, that the alarm and uproar will become pretty general in Wales. How foolish these resolutions are, in a general view, we have seen above; but, they are not to be wondered at. People, and especially those who have been partizans of the Pitt paper system, feel a degree of mortification, hardly to be conceived, at seeing the system totter. They fret and fume and know not on what to vent their anger. The correspondent (to whom I am much obliged) who was so good as to forward this hand-bill to me, says, that “most of the persons, signing the Resolutions, are Members of the MENAI “PITT CLUB.” Oh! how just is all this! How good it is! Ah! They thought that a turn was never to come. They will now, perhaps, begin to reflect upon the past. No: they will not do that. They will still persevere. They will go on to the last in their insolent accusations

against all those, who doubt of the goodness of that system, which has naturally produced all these alarms and distresses. Let them; let them go on! Let them, since nothing has, for so long a time, been able to mollify their malignity, be caught, at last, with curses upon their lips. Let them, as the thing comes on, fry with the continual vexation that it will not fail to engender; and, at last, let them be smothered with the overflowings of their gall.

BULLION REPORT.—I mentioned this Report, in my Register of the 4th instant, page 135. It is now out; but, I must not attempt to touch it here. I must not attempt to touch it, till I can do it *ample justice*. This is a thing not to be garbled. This Report has given me more delight than any thing I ever set my eyes on, my wife and children only excepted. If any one had left me an estate in land of ten thousand a year; nay, if the whole of Hampshire, Cuslinells and all, had been given to me in fee simple, my pleasure would not have been a millionth part so great as that inspired by the reading of this Report. For how could all the riches, all "the base lucre," in the world give me, in the way of gratification, any thing equal to that, which, in the most solemn manner, and coming from the highest authority, confirms the truth of those doctrines, which, during many years, I have been inculcating, and for inculcating which I have been so foully belied and so grossly abused.—Yes, reader, I am in a prison, to be sure, but my principles are *at large*; they are spread far and wide, and have made greater progress than ever within the last two months.—This **BULLION REPORT**, reader, you and the nation and the whole civilized world, shall possess, with such explanations, such a commentary, as shall make the whole as clear as the Criss Cross Row. But, to give it you in this state requires time; and, though I shall not rest till it be done, I cannot promise it next week, it being (in order to do the thing in a complete manner) necessary for me to refer to many books, some of which I find it difficult to get at, and the reference to which must take up a great deal of time. Your patience, however, shall not, if I have life, go unrequited.—I cannot, however, for the life and soul of me, refrain from begging you to think of the Bank's paying in gold **AT TWO YEARS FROM THIS TIME!** Do,

pray, think of that. Oh! what precious work we are going to have! We are now going to see things that none of us ever thought, or ever dreamt, of.

PORTUGAL.—The dispatch from my lord the Viscount of Talavera and Baron of Douro will have been read by every one long before this sheet can get to the press. The *dispatch*, did I say? I mean a *part* of the dispatch; and "*Extract of a Letter, &c.*" My readers remember, doubtless, how we were treated with extracts from my lord Talavera de la Reyna's letters, about the time of the great victory, which gave rise to that title.—The Morning Post tells us, that our army in Portugal is "*full of confidence*;" that "the Portuguese soldiers *behave admirably*;" and, that, in General Craufurd's affair, "British soldiers gave the enemy an *earnest* of what may be *expected in a general engagement*." Did they indeed? What! is the same to happen to the whole army, that then happened to one division of it? Call you that backing your friends? I am not saying that General Craufurd committed any fault; but, he went away from the place where he was. The enemy having come to the spot where he was, he went away, and the enemy went after him. Now, if this was an *earnest* of what was to happen, when a general engagement takes place, there can, I imagine, be but little doubt as to what will be the fate of Portugal.—This "*extract*" from my Lord Talavera de la Reyna's letter does not contain any account of the *strength of the enemy*; which I the more marvel at, seeing that (as we were before informed, you know, reader) so many of the French soldiers were continually *deserting*, and coming over to us and our allies. It was, therefore, very easy, one would have thought, to ascertain the exact numbers of the enemy. There are, doubtless, very cogent and wise reasons for not publishing the whole of Lord Talavera's dispatch, and for not stating to us the *force of the enemy*; but, there is no reason why I should not remind my readers that we have a very numerous army to meet that enemy; that we are paying no less than 30 thousand Portuguese troops, besides 30 thousand of our own, in that country; that we have there, in short, *an army of sixty thousand men*, with horses in abundance, with a numerous train of artillery, attended by ships of war and

transports and boats without end. The Morning Post seems to *complain*, that Lord Talavera has not had *force enough* sent to him, and it calls aloud for our *last man* to be instantly sent off. But, if the force he has, be not sufficient, what will, or what can, be sufficient? At any rate, we are *paying*, in Portugal, an army of *Sixty thousand men*! Always bear that fact in mind; and, when the thing is over, you will easily judge whether the effect be worthy of the means.—I regret, for another reason, that we have been fed so scantily upon this letter of my Lord Talavera de la Reyna. My brains had been puzzled to discover, *why my Lord TALAVERA waited with his army to see the French take Rodrigo, before he began to move off.* This perhaps, might have been explained by the letter, if we could but have seen the whole of it.—But, in the absence of this explanation, let us bear in mind; let us repeat it to ourselves and to others; “first, last, middle and without end,” let us repeat, that we, the people of this country, *are paying an army of Sixty thousand men in Portugal.*

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
17th August, 1810.

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether *broken sets* of the REGISTER can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, *at present*; but, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

IRISH CORN.

Sir;—In consequence of your observations in the Register of the 4th respecting Irish Grain, I beg to trouble you with the following accurate statement of prices taken from the enclosed return of the markets. In Dublin, week ending August 2nd, wheat per barrel of 20 stone, middle price 68s., or about 108s. 9d. per English quarter of 32½ stone, or 100s. exchange being at par.—Oats per barrel of 14 stone 19s. 9d. or about 29s. per English quarter of 21½ stone, or 26s. 7d. exchange at par.—At Cork wheat is at 52s. 8d. per barrel, which is 77s. English per English quarter. At Wexford wheat is at 48s. per barrel, which is 70s. 5d. English per English quarter. At the same place oats are 14s. per barrel which is 19s. 3d. English per

English quarter. At Ennis they are 15s. 6d. At Galway 12s. 6d. At Youghal 15s. 5d. Irish per barrel.—With respect to the new harvest, there never was known such a prospect of abundance. The wheat crop is particularly promising, so is the potatoe crop.—In case you, or any of your readers, wish to compare the prices of grain in these two countries, you may do so by taking the English quarter of wheat at 32½ stone of 14 lb.; of barley at 28 stone; of oats at 21½ stone. The Irish barrel of wheat at 20 stone, of barley at 16 stone, of oats at 14 stone.

A. B.

9th August, 1810.

FRENCH ARGUS.

The Situation and Prospects of England, as described in the ARGUS, a News-paper published in the English language at Paris; which News-paper is said to have been conducted by MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR.

“At the moment when we are terminating our labours, we naturally look back upon the career we have traversed; and the changes produced in Europe in less than nine years, appear to us, as it were, the work of nine centuries.—We recollect what was the origin of this. The *ultimatum* that preceded the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens is still fresh in our memory. The Britannic Cabinet scarcely needed pretexts to break a treaty which it openly avowed to have been no more than a truce. Its object and policy at that period was to reduce the power of France, by stirring up enemies against her on the Continent; but on comparing the situation of the belligerent parties, and considering what they were then, and what they are now, we are struck at seeing how far England is from having realized the hopes held out to her, and how much France has surpassed even all that her most ardent friends could have conceived. On both sides, the results of this war are so many important lessons to be treasured up.—To begin this picture, with an examination of the finances of England. It is known with what emphasis the Ministers, every year, announce their prosperous state. Their speeches are pompous; their calculations rigorously just; but the result of their labours uniformly is, to augment the taxes, and open fresh loans! In 1802, the general produce of the taxes, exclusive of the interest of the debt, was estimated at £34,000,000 sterling; in

1809, it was £53,000,000, and the expenditure of 1810 must carry it still higher. Men of sense are struck with this progressive augmentation, to which, if we add about £20,000,000 sterling, for the interest of the National Debt, the whole territorial income of Great Britain is scarcely adequate. These are results that speak more plainly than the hypothetical calculations of Gentz, Ivernois, &c. Though the system of the Sinking Fund, when subjected to mathematical examination, can extinguish this enormous debt in a given space of time, yet this certainly has, hitherto, been in the hands of the English Ministry only a lure to gull the people, and to make them support, without murmuring, the oppressive weight of loans. At the creation of the Sinking Fund, the public debt was only £238,000,000. What then have been the results to England of this marvellous invention? An increase of more than £400,000,000 in twenty-four years. Either the calculations were false, or the Ministers have governed ill. Mr. Pitt calculated the extinction of the debt upon the supposition of fifty years of peace, and his Ministry was remarkable only for his obstinate perseverance in a war ruinous to his country! Accordingly, his fantastic calculations were constantly disappointed. His successors have followed his system, and while boasting of the wealth of the nation, they have been daily enlarging the abyss which is open before it. The facility with which the loans are filled up, dazzles the vulgar. We have repeatedly had occasion to shew how burdensome they are to the State. The intimate connection between the Bank and the Exchequer renders them still more dangerous. The bill, which suspended the payments at the Bank in specie, which, though it ought to have been only a few months in force, has now existed 13 years, actually placed the Bank and the Government in a state of insolvency. The confidence of individuals may certainly make them content themselves with the fictitious value they receive; but this confidence will have an end. The successive depreciation of the paper-money must necessarily lead to a crisis which the union of the Bank and Government cannot prevent.—The administration of the finances of France presents quite another aspect. There the revenue is equal to the expenditure. Foreign and expensive war has not in the least deranged the

system. The safety of the State does not rest on hypothetic calculations. The economic regimen of this vast empire is as simple as that of a family; the system of loans leaves no uneasiness for the future—the debts of the past are provided for, and there is no intention of contracting new debts. In a word, the largest State in Europe is the least in debt; and the institution of the Bank augments the circulation of specie, without creating any apprehension as to the solidity of its paper.—If, from an examination of the finances, we proceed to that of the internal administration of the two countries, we find every Session of the British Parliament offering fresh enormities, or teeming with fruitless accusations for the punishment of past misconduct, or unavailing complaints in order to prevent the future errors of Ministers. Still the blood and treasures of the nation are lavished in disastrous expeditions, and the citizens are a prey to a spirit of faction, the forerunner of anarchical disturbances. Ireland, still separate, notwithstanding its union, is in a manner proscribed, as to three-fourths of her population, and subject, with regard to her worship, her peasantry, and her existence, to iniquitous restrictions. In France, on the contrary, every Session of the Legislative Body has been distinguished by institutions adapted to the interests and the manners of the nation. Every people called to make part of this vast empire, have instantly entered upon the enjoyments of the benefits of a legislation to all protective and equal. Thus have the arts, the sciences, and literature, every where taken a new flight; and the distinguished productions which have characterised this reign, will not be lost to future generations. Here agriculture, the first of arts, has made a most remarkable progress; and France, thus fertile, may barter her surplus for the commodities she wants. The well judged prohibition of English merchandize has supported the national industry; a few years perseverance in this wise policy will secure the existence of the new manufactures that have sprung up in the interior. The English Government, perhaps at this moment, persists in making war only for the interests of its commerce, and every day diminishes its advantages; every campaign precipitates its ruin. The manufactories of London, Birmingham, and Manchester, are deserted. Thousands of artisans have no other means of subsistence but the poor-rates. The markets

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of the continent are shut to their productions, whilst French merchandize every where finds vent and purchasers. The interruption of colonial commerce is to France only a transient evil, from which result permanent advantages. She pays dearer for a few foreign commodities, but she abounds in the necessaries of life. During this interruption of her communications with different countries, her internal navigation is improving, and highways are, in all directions, opening between provinces, the diversity of whose productions presents the most-advantageous and solid commerce to the ingenuity of the speculator, the industry of the artisan, or the labour of the agriculturist.—What are the advantages that England derives from a monopoly odious to all nations? A few individuals grow rich, but the mass of the people suffer. To a particular speculation, that of having the brokerage of foreign commodities, the Government sacrifices the more solid advantage which it previously drew from the national industry. It has reduced a part of its population to a state of misery; it teaches the rest of Europe to dispense with its productions; it places itself at the mercy of events; it makes its power and wealth subordinate to resources which are quite foreign to it. The superiority of its marine dazzles its eyes. It is by having a few vessels more, that it thinks to avert the inevitable ascendancy of France. It is by the acquisition of a few petty islands, that it thinks to counterbalance the incorporation of many large States with the great Empire! But how much has the relative power of England and France changed since 1803?—With less pride in his pretensions, with more frankness in his policy, the genius of Napoleon has laid the foundations of a power henceforth immovable. The war of 1805, which Mr. Pitt looked upon as a master-piece of policy, gave rise to the League of the Rhine, and the kingdoms of Westphalia, Holland, and Naples. That of Prussia extended the boundaries of the League of the Rhine to the Vistula; and the obstinacy of the British Government, in refusing every overture of peace, after the Treaty of Tilsit, and during the conferences at Erfurth, and the intrigues carried on in Spain and Portugal against France, have put the Peninsula under the inevitable dominion of the Empire. Finally, the last efforts of the disciples of Mr. Pitt to seduce the Austrian Cabinet,

have laid, between two nations made to esteem each other, the foundations of a peace, of which a recent august alliance will perpetuate the duration. Thus has France been successively strengthened by all the Allies that England had at the commencement of the war of the Revolution; and the English Ministry, constantly blundering in the employment of its military means, has shewn an equal want of foresight in its political combinations.—They might have appeared with some advantage, or, at all events, with some honour, in the field of battle, when the armies of the Coalitions maintained the contest with France. During those memorable campaigns, there were twenty occasions in which 40,000 English, landed in Italy or Germany, might have created a diversion truly beneficial. But then the English Ministry were employed only in such expeditions as that of Copenhagen. They thought less of serving their allies than of weakening all of them, and of destroying even the very shadow of a maritime and commercial power. Their conduct has discovered their secret. They became sensible of their error, when the unexpected victories of France deprived them of all hope of repairing it. From that moment, as to a war by land, they ought only to have taken a defensive attitude; yet, all of a sudden, they assumed the offensive, when they had nothing else to expect but the useless loss of men and money. Out of one error they have fallen into another, and put to hazard their internal security, without re-conquering the military honour they had lost. The same spirit of absurdity made them undertake and misconduct the expeditions to Spain and Walcheren. They will exhibit nearly the same results in the history of the war. Hitherto the English army seems only to have kept its ground because there was no French army to contend with it. But the Ministry themselves have no serious intention of defending Portugal when it shall be regularly attacked. Soon they will only be embarrassed as to the means of saving the fragments of an army that would have been better employed in the defence of their own territory.—Thus is the sum total of the present war, that of having given to France all the Allies that England had at the commencement of it—having augmented the direct dominion of France by a population of from 25 to 30,000,000 of inhabitants—having given her an extent of more than 1,200 leagues

of coast, many maritime ports of the first rank, and several new dock-yards on the North Sea, the Ocean, Mediterranean, and Adriatic—having given her a continental commerce, which the whole British navy cannot obstruct—an influence which nothing can henceforward diminish. As to England, the result of 8 years of war has been such an increase of her debt and expenditure, that she can no longer do without paper-money, the first step towards Bankruptcy—the augmentation, and the necessity of a still greater augmentation, of a maritime establishment, which is out of all proportion to her population, and her demands for the defence of her colonies—that of being left, as to her foreign concerns, in the same insulated state in which she wished to place France, with the loss of all her commercial relations with the Continent of Europe; (for the alliance she still maintains with Turkey will be as short lived, as the alliance which prolongs the calamities of the Spanish peninsula)—that of soon having to watch 2,000 leagues of coast, and sixty maritime ports, whence, in defiance of her, will sally forth numerous fleets, capable of disputing with her the freedom of the seas; when that moment shall have arrived, England will be struck with terror at the abyss dug by a succession of weak or perfidious Ministers.—If the present can supply any certain data for calculating the future, this war must gradually produce the absolute ruin of that once flourishing nation. Hitherto she has supported her financial system by uncommon efforts and extraordinary advantages that are daily diminishing. She has supported her maritime and military establishment by the divisions she has fostered among the Continental Powers—by the treachery and desertion of foreign soldiers and sailors, whom she has taken into her pay. She has for a time prolonged the existence of her commerce by smuggling. She had no fear of her colonies, owing to the necessity to which she reduced France of attending exclusively to the affairs of the Continent. But, at length, general tranquillity is on the point of being established; and England, which hitherto has had to defend only foreign interests, is on the eve of fighting *pro aris et focis*; and then it is that her weakness will become manifest. The actual superiority of her marine, and the vast extent of her colonies, cannot save her. We have just shewn, that she will be com-

pelled to augment her naval expenditure, to which the profits of her commerce will be inadequate. Meanwhile, she will neither have foreign seamen, nor ship-timber, nor iron, and the other materials, which she has hitherto procured at a low price from the North. If she designs to follow up her system of blockade, she will require an establishment double of what she now has; and her cruising squadrons, always weak or ill supplied, will be, at length, beaten or forced to shun the conflict. The loss of 20 naval engagements will not compel France to abandon her system; within her own territory, or that of the allies, she will possess all the means of repairing her losses. If she gains a single battle, the maritime superiority of England will have vanished, and 60,000 men, encamped at Boulogne, will make those lords of the ocean tremble to all eternity.—In the enormous extent of the colonies of England, there is undoubtedly something to flatter the pride of those who judge superficially of the force of a state. But this colossal power carries within itself the seeds of destruction. The colonial system received a violent shock by the separation of the United States of America. The revolt of St. Domingo gave the second example. The bloody intrigues of the English Ministry in Spain, may lead to the independence of the Spanish colonies; and this revolution, in which it absurdly seems to rejoice, advances the epoch of that which must inevitably effect, in both hemispheres—the independence of colonies powerful enough to defend themselves, and rich enough to subsist upon their own resources. The English Ministry, blinded by ambition, hatred and cupidity, has, long beforehand, been preparing those calamities which will prove fatal to England alone. The French Empire, where the revenue, the expenditure, the population, and the military establishment, are so completely harmonized, requires, in reality, nothing but a free commerce, in order to avail herself of all the wealth of the universe. Her industry, and the surplus of her territorial produce, will procure for her all the enjoyments of Asiatic luxury, at a less expence than the establishment of distant colonies.—England, on the contrary, cannot behold this revolution without sinking into a Power of the third order. In vain would she pretend to engross the commerce of the whole world by the superiority of her navy. This superiority, as we have al-

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ready observed, may be disputed with her. Besides, she eagerly clings to the extent of her colonial possessions, which she must defend. In the event of a general separation of the great colonies from their mother-countries, they will desire commercial independence after establishing political independence. England will then have to maintain, in all parts of the world, that contest which has been protracted, for these last three years, with the United States. The terms of the contest may vary, but the substance will remain the same; and its inevitable result must be the abolition of the odious laws which Great Britain wishes to impose upon the rest of the world.—Whilst this grand epoch is in train, a change, fatal to the interests of England, is operating in the commerce of Europe. The continental communications, of one State with another, are beginning to be carried on with more regularity; their industry is improving: their agriculture makes remarkable progress. The impolitic war in which Turkey has been involved, retards the epoch when new routes will be opened to European commerce into the very heart of Asia. But whatever be the issue of this struggle, Constantinople must be the rampart of the Continental system.—Great rivers form a conveyance from the extremities of Europe to the very foot of its walls; a land-locked sea carries its vessels to the centre of Asia; and against such advantages the English Navy will be absolutely inefficient. Constantinople is the terror of the British commerce. Hence the ministry has always endeavoured to keep that Power in ignorance of her means, or to make her misapply them. But the revolution which must occur in the commerce of the world is approaching, and that revolution will reduce England to her proper station, if some catastrophe do not precipitate her ruin in a more violent manner.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Gazette Account of General Craufurd's Defeat near Almeida.*

DOWNING STREET, 11 Aug. 1810.—*A Dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was this morning received at Lord Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, dated Alverca, July 25, 1810.*

The cavalry attached to general Crau-

furd's advanced guard remained in the villages near the fort of La Concepcion till the 21st instant, when the enemy obliged it to retire towards Almeida, and the fort La Concepcion was destroyed.—From the 21st till yesterday morning, brigadier-general Craufurd continued to occupy a position near Almeida, with his left within 800 yards of the Fort, and his right extending towards Junca. The enemy attacked him in this position yesterday morning, shortly after day-light, with a very large body of infantry and cavalry, and the Brigadier-General retired across the bridge over the Coa.—In this operation, I am sorry to say, that the troops under his command suffered considerable loss.—The enemy afterwards made three efforts to storm the bridge over the Coa, in all of which they were repulsed.—I am informed that throughout this trying day the commanding officers of the 43d, 52d, and 95th regiments, lieut. col. Beckwith, lieut. col. Barclay, and lieut. col. Hull, and all the officers and soldiers of these excellent regiments, distinguished themselves. In lieut. col. Hull, who was killed, his Majesty has lost an able and deserving officer.—Brigadier general Craufurd has also noticed the steadiness of the 3d regiment of Portuguese Chasseurs under the command of lieut. col. Elder.—Since yesterday the enemy have made no movement.

Copy of General Craufurd's Report, inclosed in Lord Wellington's Dispatch of the 25th July, dated Carvelhal, July 25, 1810.

My Lord; I have the honour to report to your Lordship, that yesterday morning the enemy advanced to attack the light division with between three and four thousand cavalry, a considerable number of guns, and a large body of infantry. On the first appearance of the heads of their columns, the cavalry and brigade of artillery attached to the division advanced to support the picquets, and captain Ross, with four guns, was for some time engaged with those attached to the enemy's cavalry, which were of much larger calibre.—As the immense superiority of the enemy's force displayed itself, we fell back gradually towards the fortress, upon the right of which the infantry of the division was posted, having its left in some inclosures near the windmill, about 800 yards from the place, and its right to the Coa, in a very broken and extensive position, which it was absolutely necessary to

occupy, in order to cover the passage of the cavalry and artillery through the long defile leading to the bridge. After this was effected, the infantry retired by degrees, and in as good order as it is possible in ground so extremely intricate. A position close in front of the bridge was maintained as long as was necessary, to give time for the troops which had passed to take up one behind the river; and the bridge was afterwards defended with the greatest gallantry, though I am sorry to say with considerable loss, by the 43d and part of the 95th regiments. Towards the afternoon the firing ceased; and after it was dark, I withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retired to this place. The troops behaved with the greatest gallantry.—(Signed) R. CRAUFURD.

Those returned as prisoners and missing were taken in a charge of the enemy's cavalry just after our cavalry and guns had begun to retire.

Names of Officers killed, wounded and missing.

KILLED—43d Foot—Lieut.-col. Edward Hull, captain E. Cameron, lieut. John Nison.—95th Foot—Lieut. Donald M'Leod.—**WOUNDED**—Staff—Lieut. Shaw, 43d Regiment, aid-de-camp to brig.-general R. Craufurd, slightly. 14th Light Dragoons—Lieut. Blatchford, severely. 1st Battalion of the 43d Regiment—Captains P. Deshon, T. Lloyd, and W. F. P. Napier, slightly; captain J. W. Hall, severely; lieut. George Johnstone, slightly; lieut. J. P. Hopkins, severely; lieut. Horatio Hancot, slightly; lieutenants J. M'Dermid, J. Stevenson, Roger Frederick, severely.—52d ditto—Major Henry Ridewood, slightly; captain R. Campbell, ditto.—95th ditto—Captain Jasper Creagh and Samuel Mitchell, severely, since dead; 1st lieutenant H. C. Smith, slightly; 1st lieutenants Mathias Pratt, Peter Riley, Alex. Coane, and Thomas Smith, severely; 2d lieutenant George Simmons, ditto.—**MISSING**—1st Battalion of the 95th Regiment—Lieut. J. G. M'Culloch, taken prisoner.

Return of the Number of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a Division of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Lieut.-Gen. Lord Viscount

Wellington, K. B. in Action with the French Army near Almeida, on the 21st July, 1810.—Head Quarters, Alverca, July 15, 1810.

Staff—1 Staff, wounded.—Royal Horse Artillery—2 horses, killed; 2 horses, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—14th Light Dragoons—1 serjeant killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 rank and file, 4 horses wounded.—16th Light Dragoons—3 horses wounded.—1st Hussars, King's German Legion—1 horse killed; 2 rank and file, 3 horses wounded.—1st Battalion 43d Foot—1 lieut.-col., 1 captain, 1 lieut., 2 serjeants, 13 rank and file killed; 4 captains, 6 lieutenants, 8 serjeants, 77 rank and file wounded; 1 drummer, 14 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion 52d Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 captain wounded; 3 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion 95th Foot—1 lieutenant, 11 rank and file killed; 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 54 rank and file wounded; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 52 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion Portuguese Cassadores—2 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—3d Ditto—2 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 23 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—**TOTAL**—1 lieut.-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 29 rank and file, 3 horses killed; 1 Staff, 1 major, 7 captains, 12 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 10 serjeants, 164 rank and file, 12 horses wounded; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 80 rank and file missing.—N. B. One Officer of the Portuguese Cassadores wounded, rank and name not ascertained. (Signed) C. STEWART, Brig.-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.